Monday, April 1, 2019

Trumans Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb

Trumans finis to Drop the Atomic give outIt was spring of 1945, and the Second instauration War was coming to a determinative conclusion. Germany had twilighted, and Hitler had committed suicide. In addition, Italy had begun working out the details of its tumble with Allied diplomats. lacquer, however, ref exampled to surrender. Even after the decisive American victories at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, lacquers Emperor, Hirohito, ref habitd to give in to the Allys demand for categorical surrender. Japans defiance forced join States President Harry Truman to make the nigh important decision of his presidency whether to give the order to invade the Nipponese brinyland or use the nuclear break down. President Truman, after many months of conscientious consideration and countless meetings with his secretaire of War total heat Stimson, decided to use the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This decision involved four major justifications use of the atomic bomb would end th e contend successfully at the brieflyest possible moment, it would achieve diplomatic gains in the growing rivalry with the Soviet Union, it would satisfy Americas hatred of the Japanese and it would satisfy the adopt for Americans to avenge the bombing of Pearl Harbor.As the struggle continued into its fifth year, the struggle for Europe was successfully ended by the use of what be now called conventional means, but the war in the Pacific hushed needed to be drawn to a close, and as quickly as possible (Stimson 98). Truman and his administration gestated that only comp allowe destruction of her Japan military occasion could open the way to lasting peace however, there were several options for close the war. Trumans first attempt to end the war involved convincing Japan to surrender under the new conditions of the surrender document (Stimson 101). The Japanese believe that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction, and there atomic number 18 as yet no indications that they are ready to accept much(prenominal) terms, however, it appeared that Japan might surrender at any metre dep goal upon the conditions of surrender (Command Decision 504-505). On July 26, 1945, the Allies issued the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan. It was an opportunity for Japan to surrender immediately or face prompt and utter destruction (Nobile 53). However, due(p) to political op eyeshot from American Senators and Congressmen to weaken the terms of unconditional surrender, depository of State Byrnes eliminated all reference of the possibility that Emperor Hirohito could retain the throne. In addition to this elimination, all references to the atomic bomb and the Soviets entry into the war were withal omitted. As a result of these changes, the proclamation was not effective in changing the position of Japans government.After this failed attempt at diplomatically polish the war, a military invasion of the Japanese mainland now seemed to be the most viable solution to ending the war as soon as possible. This plan, however, was predicted to be very existly and dangerous. Sean Malloy believes that the bomb was apply to avoid a million casualties, to American forces alone and enemy casualtiesmuch larger than our ingest (162). Stimson was informed that much(prenominal) an operation might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone. Additional large losses might be expected among our allies and, of course, if our campaign were successful and if we could hear by previous experience, enemy casualties would be much larger than our witness (McKain 141). However, the ground invasion still posed the question, whether this kind of action would relieve oneself surrender (McKain 141). Stimson, in his memorandum for the president, questionedif there are any alternatives to such(prenominal) a forceful occupation of Japan which will secure for us the equivalent of an unconditional surrender of her forces and a permanent destruction of her berth again to strike an aggressive blow at the peace of the Pacific. (McKain 142-143)Stimson, who lastly convinced Truman, that there is enough such change to surrender to make it good worth while (McKain 143). The reality behind Trumans decision to use the atomic bomb was that the bomb would be favored over an invasion.President Truman base part of his decision on post-war politics. Truman and his advisers knew there were alternative ways of ending the war in the Pacific but deliberately went ahead with displace the atomic bomb because of the perceived diplomatic advantages. From the very beginning of Trumans Presidency, Secretary of War Stimson advised him that the atomic weapon might be utilitarian in post war diplomatic disagreements with the Soviets (Nobile 40). The atomic bomb allowed the linked States, in the following months after Japans surrender, to follow a strategy of atomic diplomacy in dealing with its war-time ally the Soviet Union. In addition, Truman believed that the bomb would make Russia more manageable in Europe (Command Decisions 510). In sum of money using the atomic bomb would intimidate the Soviets. In a garner from the Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy to President Truman, McCloy recommended the followingThe time now and the method now to deal with Russia was to keep our mouths shut and let our actions speak for our words. The Russians understand them better than anything else. It is a case where we have got to acquire the lead and perhaps do it in a pretty unfit and realistic way. (Roleff 120)Secretary of State James Byrnes more than anyone else inside the Administration, support Trumans hopes that, the bombmight well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war (Nobile 40).Trumans decision to drop the bomb was also based on his impression that he would be support by a majority of the American public because it satisfied their hatred of the Japanese. Japan thro ughout the war and plausibly in all our history, no foe had been so detested as were the Japanese (Nobile 17). This great disgust for the Japanese stemmed from Japans sermon of prisoners of war (POWs), and use of kamikaze pilots on the American Navy. Treatment of prisoners in Japanese camps varied, although it was forever and a day very poor. Prisoners were known to have been thrown off cliffs or used for bayonet practice. The infamy of Pearl Harbor was enoughBut to it were soon added circumstantial accounts of Japanese atrocities at Hong Kong, Singapore, and finally and most appallingly, upon American prisoners in the PhilippinesEmotions forgotten since our most savage Indian wars were reawakened (Nobile 17)The use of Japanese kamikaze pilots as a weapon against the United State Navy and Air soldiery was an addition opening of anger. This unconventional military tactic confirmed Japanese fanaticism and every navel battle was now a argue to the finish (Nobile 9). This tactic w as so successful that several thousand kamikaze planes were behave aside for an invasion of the Japanese mainland that never happened. By the end of the war, kamikaze pilots had destroy thirty-six US war ships and killed over 5,000 sailors. Trumans decision to drop the atomic bomb could have been justified out of hatred for the poor treatment for American POW, and the use of kamikaze pilots as a military tactic. and the surprise bang on Pearl Harbor ( McKain 28-35).Revenge was also a source of motivation for Truman to drop the atomic bomb. Americans regarded their Pacific enemy as a nation of treacherous and inhuman fanatics. Wartime advertising and propaganda portrayed the Japanese as sub-human monkey-men, vicious rodents, or venomous insects especially for their surprise antiaircraft gun on the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor. The surprise attack resulted in the death of nearly 2,500 service men, and the destruction of many of the United States aircraft carriers, batt leships, cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft (Hiroshima Why the Bomb was Dropped Roleff 88-89). Ultimately, the American public supported Trumans decision because it quelled their thirst for revenge against Japan.I did what I thought was right Truman responded, when asked a question regarding the decision to drop the atomic bomb (Hiroshima Why the Bomb was Dropped). Truman justified his position that using the atomic bomb on Japan was completely necessary because it would end the war successfully at the earliest possible moment, it would achieve diplomatic gains in the growing rivalry with the Soviet Union, it would satisfy Americas hatred of the Japanese and it would satisfy Americas trust for revenge. It has been argued in recent years if the atomic bomb was truly justifiable, jibe to Stimson, Trumans Secretary of WarIn light of the alternatives which, on a graceful estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose ending the war and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face. (Stimson 106)The main goal of President Truman, once accepting the office of president, was to end the war in the shortest amount of time and with the fewest American lives lost. Truman was able to accomplish this goal through dropping the atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.Bibliography nub of Military History, United States Army. Command Decisions The Decision toUse the Atomic Bomb. capital of the United States GPO, 1990.Hiroshima Why the Bomb was Dropped. Peter Jennings Reporting. ABC. WDIG,New York. 1996.Malloy, Sean L. Atomic Tragedy Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to use the Bombagainst Japan. New York Cornell University, 2008.McKain, Mark. Making and Using the Atomic Bomb. naut mi Greenhaven Press,2003.Nobile, Philip. Judgment at the Smithsonian The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.New York Marlowe, 1995.Roleff, Tamara L. The Atomic Bomb. San Diego Greenhaven Press, 2000.Stimson, Henry L. The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb. Harpers Magazine Feb.1947 97-107.Truman Library. 20 Jan. 2009. The Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. 24 Jan. 2009http//www.trumanlibrary.org/index.php

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